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This paper investigates the effect of trade integration on military conflict. Our empirical analysis, 
based on a large panel data set of 290,040 country-pair observations from 1950 to 2000, 
confirms that an increase in bilateral trade interdependence and global trade openness 
significantly promotes peace. It also suggests that the effect of trade openness varies 
depending on the geographical proximity of countries. The peace-promotion effect of bilateral 
trade integration is significantly higher for contiguous countries that are likely to experience 
more conflicts. The analysis shows, however, that an increase in global trade openness reduces 
the probability of conflict more for countries far apart from each other than it does for countries 
sharing borders. The results also show that military conflict between countries significantly 
reduces not only bilateral trade interdependence but also multilateral trade integration. The main 
finding of the peace-promotion effect of bilateral and global trade integration holds robust when 
controlling for the natural and geopolitical characteristics of dyads of states that may influence 
the probability of military conflict and for the simultaneous determination of trade and peace. 
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1. Introduction 
“The great extent and rapid increase of international trade, in being the principal guarantee of 
the peace of the world, is the great permanent security for the uninterrupted progress of the 
ideas, the institutions, and the character of the human race” (John Stuart Mill, Principles of 
Political Economy, London: Longmans, 1909, p.582). 
Globalization has been one of the most salient features of the world economy over the last 
century. Emerging markets and developing countries continue to integrate into the global trading 
system. World trade has increased rapidly, particularly since World War II—from 17.8% of world 
GDP in 1960 to 47.4% in 2005.  
There has been a long tradition among social scientists to try to understand the economic, 
political, and social consequences of globalization. It has always been a hotly-debated topic—
not merely within academia but among the general public as well—whether globalization 
significantly affects economic growth, income inequality, national identity, and so on.  
This paper examines the effect of trade integration on international relations, specifically military 
conflict between individual states (interstate conflict). Recent literature shows that military 
conflict can be extremely disruptive to economic activity and impede long-term economic 
performance (Davis and Weinstein, 2002, Blomberg, Hess and Orphanides, 2004, and Barro, 
2006). In particular, they empirically study the effect military conflict has on international trade. 
They find that conflict between countries significantly reduces international trade and thus 
seriously damages national and global economic welfare (Glick and Taylor, 2006, Blomberg and 
Hess, 2006 and Martin, Mayer and Thoenig, 2008). However, the opposite relationship between 
international trade and the probability of interstate military conflict—whether international trade 
has any significant impact on conflict—has not been clearly assessed.  
Does trade integration contribute to peace? There are at least two important issues underlying 
this question. The first is to distinguish between bilateral trade interdependence and global trade 
integration.
1 If trade integration occurs in a way of increasing trade interdependence uniformly 
with all bilateral trade partners, the distinction between bilateral and global trade integration is 
not critical. However, deeper integration into global markets can take place even with lowering 
trade interdependence with some trading partners. The overall impact of trade integration on 
interstate conflict is likely to depend not only on the change in bilateral trade interdependence 
but also on global trade integration. 
The second issue concerns whether the effect of trade integration on interstate conflict varies 
depending on characteristics of dyads, or specific pairs of states. For instance, neighboring 
states are likely to be engaged in more trade and disputes, whereas for nations geographically 
far apart, or distant states, interstate trade and political relations tend to be less intense. Thus, 
an increase in bilateral and global trade integration may affect dyads of states differently 
depending on geographical distance. Greater bilateral trade interdependence can be more 
helpful in promoting peace for countries closer geographically by preventing disputes from 
escalating into military conflicts. From another angle, it can be conjectured that for 
geographically distant countries banded together in a global conflict (rather than local conflict), 
an increase in global trade openness might reduce the probability of military conflict between 
them more significantly than for countries closer geographically.  
                                                 
1  The phrase “global trade integration” implies “trade openness,” which is often measured by the ratio of total trade to GDP at 
the aggregate national level.   
 3
While several previous empirical studies have investigated the effect of trade integration on 
military conflict between countries, there is no systematic empirical research assessing the 
peace-promotion effect of both bilateral trade and global trade integration—and its interaction 
with geographical characteristics of states. Although a number of studies have addressed this 
issue, there remains a lack of consensus.
2 This paper attempts to fill this gap and produces 
novel results.   
An empirical assessment of the impact of trade integration on military conflict is done based on 
regression equations utilizing a panel data set of dyadic observations from 1950 to 2000. The 
results show that an increase in bilateral trade interdependence and global trade integration 
significantly promotes peace between countries. The strong positive effect of global trade 
openness on peace is a novel finding, contrasting the result of Martin et al. (2008). We also find 
that the impact of trade integration on military conflict varies depending on the geographical 
proximity between countries. Bilateral trade interdependence promotes peace more significantly 
for contiguous countries, whereas global trade openness contributes more to peace between 
distant countries. The results also show that geopolitical factors such as bilateral distance, 
alliance commitment, joint democracy, oil exports, and religious similarity influence the 
probability of military conflict among dyads of states.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly discusses the effect of bilateral trade 
interdependence and global trade integration on military interstate conflict. In Section III, we 
explain data and the empirical methodology for evaluating the effects of bilateral and global 
trade dependence on the probability of military conflict. Section IV presents and discusses the 
estimation results. Section V analyzes the impact of military conflict on bilateral and global 
(multilateral) trade integration. Concluding remarks follow in Section VI.  
2.  The Impact of Bilateral and Global Trade Integration on Conflict  
There is ongoing debate among scholars whether the increase of bilateral economic 
interdependence reduces interstate conflict. The “liberal peace” view in political science—traced 
back to Montesquieu, Kant, Angell, and Schumpeter—emphasizes that mutual economic 
interdependence can be a conduit of peace. It suggests that a higher degree of bilateral 
economic interdependence limits the incentive to use military force in interstate relations. For 
instance, a state more trade-dependent is less likely to fight a partner because of the larger 
opportunity cost associated with the loss of trade. Business elites—who gain most from an 
increased economic interdependence—will also lobby the state to restrict the use of military 
force against an important trading partner.   
While the “liberal peace” view is convincing, there are numerous counter-arguments. For 
instance, the Dependency theorists (Wallerstein, 1974) and neo-Marxists (Emmanuel, 1972), 
argue that asymmetric economic interdependence could lead to negative consequences in a 
country—such as exploited concession and threatened national autonomy—thereby creating 
interstate tensions and conflicts (Dos Santos, 1970 and Keohane and Nye, 1973). Many wars in 
history evolved out of trade disputes. 
Empirical studies have also investigated whether bilateral trade interdependence increases or 
reduces the likelihood of military conflict between trading partners. Similar to theoretical 
literature, the findings of these studies are ambiguous. Earlier studies, such as Polachek (1980) 
                                                 
2  See Section II for a brief survey of these studies.  
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and Polacheck, Robst, and Chang (1999), show that there is negative relationship between 
bilateral trade volume and the frequency of interstate military conflict. However, Barbieri (1996) 
and Barbieri and Schneider (1999) investigate the relationship between various measures of 
bilateral trade links and military conflict. They find that a measure of bilateral trade 
interdependence has a significantly positive impact on military conflict. In reverse, subsequent 
research—including Oneal and Russett (1999) and Gartzke and Li (2003)—show that with the 
use of a different measure of bilateral trade interdependence, the interdependence appears to 
reduce military conflict.  
In contrast to the numerous studies on the impact of bilateral trade interdependence on military 
conflict, there are only a few studies examining the role that global trade openness plays. An 
increase in global trade openness is expected to reduce the probability of military conflict as it 
leads to an increase in the extent of bilateral trade interdependence. However, when the level of 
bilateral trade interdependence is controlled, the effect of increased global trade openness on 
the probability of bilateral conflict is not clear. Barbieri and Peters (2003) find “trade openness” 
has a significantly negative impact on the probability of military conflict. In contrast, Martin et al. 
(2008) show that “multilateral openness,” that is, global trade openness, increases the 
probability of military conflicts. 
In general, open states can be more peaceful because they become more susceptible to 
political freedom and democracy. They apply international law better and employ good 
governance. Trade openness can also lead to an “expansion of bureaucratic structure,” which is 
concerned about economic interests in addition to security interests—and thus less likely to 
resort to military actions (Domke, 1988). Moreover, more open economies tend to be small in 
size, and thus have smaller incentive to engage in wars.  
However, Martin et al. (2008) argue that countries more open to global trade have a higher 
probability of dyadic conflict because multilateral trade openness reduces bilateral dependence 
to any given country and thus lowers the opportunity cost of military conflict. Their model 
assumes that a bilateral military conflict between countries destroys a substantial part of the 
“effective labor” in them, while it increases both bilateral and multilateral trade costs. Higher 
multilateral trade offsets welfare loss from decrease in effective labor during a bilateral conflict, 
thus reducing the opportunity cost of bilateral conflict. On the other hand, higher multilateral 
trade increases the opportunity cost of the bilateral conflict by raising multilateral trade costs. 
They further assume that the increase in multilateral trade costs following a conflict is small 
enough compared with the welfare loss due to the decrease in the number of consumption 
varieties that result from the loss in effective labor. It is a critical assumption to guarantee that 
the high level of multilateral trade has a positive impact on the probability of military conflicts.
3 
The opportunity cost of bilateral conflict would become smaller if greater global openness helps 
mitigate the loss of consumption during a military conflict by substituting for decreased domestic 
production as well as imports from the fighting countries. However, closed border and increased 
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resource cost following a bilateral military conflict often lead to a substantial increase in 
multilateral trade costs, nullifying the assumption. 
In addition, their model does not consider the possibility that a war provoked by a state against 
one trading partner can lead to a reaction from one or more other trading partners. As long as 
other trading partners in global markets prefer to do business with a peaceful partner, a dyadic 
conflict would have a negative consequence on the dyad’s trade with global partners. This 
suggests that global trade openness of the dyad can in fact reduce the incentive to provoke a 
bilateral conflict.  
Figure 1 shows the change of bilateral and multilateral trade flows of four warring dyads before, 
during, and after the conflict between them. The bilateral conflicts between countries were 
typically followed by a decrease, not only in bilateral trade flows, but also in multilateral trade. 
During military conflicts, multilateral trade declined quite notably in both states. In terms of post-
conflict multilateral trade, the state that lost the war (in terms of international perception) 
suffered a more significant decline. While this data is merely suggestive, we will employ a more 
formal empirical analysis to assess the effects military conflict has on multilateral trade (see 
Section V). 
3.  Empirical Specification and Data  
We investigate the impact of trade integration (bilateral and global) on military conflict based on 
regression equations utilizing panel data of dyadic observations from 1950 to 2000: 
 (1)    12 ijt ijt ijt ijt t ijt Y Bilateral trade Global trade X Year u α ββ γ δ =+× + × + +× +  
where the dependent variable, Yijt, equals unity if state i and j are engaged in a military conflict 
against each other at time t and equals zero otherwise, Bilateral tradeijt is a measure of bilateral 
trade interdependence between the dyad of states i and j, Global tradeijt is a measure of trade 
dependence of the dyad on global markets (except the bilateral partner), the vector Xijt 
comprises the other important determinants of interstate conflicts, and Yeart denotes a set of 
binary variables that are unity in year t. 
The measure of military  conflict is constructed from the database of the “Correlates of War 
(COW)” project.
4 This dyadic data set codes of all Military Interstate Disputes (MID) with a level 
of hostility ranging from 1 to 5 (1= no militarized action, 2= threat to use force, 3= display of 
force, 4= use of force, 5= war). This MID dataset (version 3.02) is transformed to dyadic events 
with corrections made by Zeev Maoz (Maoz, 2005).
5 
Table 1 shows the characteristics of the data set. In the sample of 572,246 dyadic observations 
from 1950 to 2000, MID events of levels 2, 3, 4, and 5 total 2,405, out of which wars of level 5 
comprise only 264. 
Our sample for regressions is restricted because of the limited availability of explanatory 
variables. In the sample of 290,040 observations, MID events total 1,593, with 75 wars. For our 
measure of the dependent variable, we use the broadest concept of military  conflicts--
                                                 
4 http://www.correlatesofwar.org/ 
5  The data set and codebook are available from http://psfaculty.ucdavis.edu/zmaoz/dyadmid.html   
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comprising all MID events of hostility levels 2, 3, 4, and 5. If the definition of military conflicts is 
restricted to interstate wars of level 5 (or 4 and 5) only, the smaller number of military conflicts 
hinders creation of robust empirical estimates.
6 
The indicator used to capture bilateral trade interdependence is the geometric average of 
bilateral trade flows over GDP of two countries. For global trade openness, we use the 
geometric average of total trade (excluding their bilateral trade flows) over GDP of two countries. 
Data on trade measured in current US dollars for 1948–2000 are from Gleditsch (2002),
7 which 
originate from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Direction of Trade database and other 
sources. Data on GDP in current US dollars are from IMF, International Financial Statistics and, 
Barbieri (2002) Dataset
8 for 1950–1965, and World Bank, World Development Indicators for 
1965–2000. We use values lagged 2 years to limit simultaneity problems.  
The specification also controls the other important determinants of interstate conflicts that are 
identified by previous literature. These control variables include geographical proximity, relative 
military power, and political and cultural factors. Military conflicts are expected to occur more 
often between neighboring countries because they are more likely to be engaged in disputes 
and they can mobilize military resources against each other more quickly. To measure 
geographical proximity, we use two variables—(i) the log of bilateral distance between countries 
and (ii) a binary variable for contiguity (by land and by sea up to 150 miles) between them. 
These variables are from the COW database.  
Relative military capabilities between states have a significant impact on the probability of 
military conflict. But it is not clear in theory whether power preponderance or power balance is 
more conducive to peace. Empirical studies, on the other hand, broadly support the view that 
states more equally balanced in military power are less inclined to engage in military conflict. 
We include the log difference of GDP as a measure of relative military power on interstate 
relationships.  
In addition, the role of “major power” countries is considered. States with foremost military 
power are more likely to undertake military actions against less powerful states to exploit 
concession, or to interfere and mediate conflicts in the world. A binary variable for a group of 
major power countries is added for five United Nations (UN) Security Council members—
People’s Republic of China, France, United Kingdom, United States, and USSR (Russia 
Federation). 
Political factors that affect the probability of military conflict include the characteristics of political 
institutions such as democracy. In political science literature, including those of the “liberal 
peace” view, nations with higher levels of democracy are less likely to engage in war. The 
democratic process necessitates more discussion and majority support from the public and the 
legislature in making major decisions such as war (Dixon 1993, and Oneal et al. 1996). For 
measurement, an index for joint democracy is used (Bremer 1993). The raw data is from Polity 
IV database,
9 which assesses each country’s level of democracy ranging from full autocracy (-
10), to full democracy (+10). The joint democracy variable is constructed by multiplying two 
                                                 
6  Estimations were conducted at MID events of levels 3, 4, and 5 only and found qualitatively similar results. 
7 http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/exptradegdp.html 
8 http://people.cas.sc.edu/barbierk/databases.html 
9  The Polity IV Project (Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2004), under the direction of Monty G. Marshall 
at George Mason University, carries data and analysis through 2006 (http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/data/).  
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countries’ indexes and then rescaling them to range from 0 to 1, with unity indicating dyads with 
two full democracies. We also include a binary variable for the presence of formal security 
alliances for dyads. This variable comes from the COW database. 
Cultural and religious factors are often argued as the root cause of interstate conflict. In his book, 
The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1996), Samuel Huntington argues 
that in the post-Cold War world, conflicts between different civilizations increasingly replaced 
those of differing ideologies. Religious difference often leads to interstate conflict due to 
fundamentalism and “securitization of faith” (Lausten and Wæver 2000). Recent conflicts such 
as the US-Iraq war and the Kosovo conflict support these arguments. Several empirical studies 
investigate the relationship between religious similarity and interstate conflict and provide mixed 
results. An early study by Henderson (1998) shows religious similarity tends to reduce the 
frequency of interstate wars. In contrast, Russet et al.(2000) and Chiozza (2002) find civilization 
differences do not have a significant influence on interstate militarized disputes.  
While these previous studies adopt a measure of religious similarity based on detailed religion 
categories, we construct a new measure of religious similarity between dyads by focusing on 
nine major religions (k=Catholic, Protestant, Other Christianity, Orthodox, Islam, Buddhism, 





R R −− ∑  
where 
k
i R  and 
k
j R denote the fraction of the religion k  in the population of country i and j 
respectively.
10 The index is similar to the ‘S’ index (Signorino and Ritter, 1999) or the ‘affinity of 
nations’ index (Gartzke, 2000) and measures the extent to which two countries share the same 
religious affiliations. It ranges between -1 (most dissimilar) and 1 (most similar). The raw data 
comes from Barret (1982, 2000)
 11  and Barro (2006). By considering only the nine major 
religions, we assume that the differences in nonreligious and other religion populations do not 
influence conflicts between states.   
The specification also considers the impact of natural resource endowment on interstate conflict 
by including an oil-exporter dummy variable. The argument that conflicts are often linked by 
control over ownership of resources or the means to access and to market them (such as trade 
routes) has a long history—since the era of mercantilism and colonialism. In particular, energy 
resources such as oil have been a major cause of interstate conflict, for example, the 1980–
1988 Iran-Iraq war (Klare 2001). The oil-exporter dummy is 1 if one of the dyads belongs to 
OPEC. Oil-net exporters are likely to be exposed to more conflicts involving their resources. 
Table 2 reports the top 15 countries that were most frequently involved in military interstate 
dispute (MID) events from 1950 to 2000. The top three countries—US, Russia (USSR and 
Russian Federation), and People’s Republic of China—belong to the “major power” category. 
                                                 
10  Guiso et al.(2005), and Helpman et al.(2008) also consider only major religions to construct a measure of religious similarity. 
But their measure is constructed by adding up the multiplications of two countries’ population shares across each religion 
category. Hence, the index ranges from 0 (most dissimilar) and 1 (most similar). This measure is problematic because, for 
instance, for a majority of dyads consisting of a country which has very small population shares in all four major religions it 
has a value always very close to 0 (most dissimilar) regardless of the religions in the other country, predicting counter-
intuitively that the dyads are most likely to engage in interstate conflict (as much as other dyads in which two countries are 
completely different in major religions). In contrast, our measure will have different values based on the degree of similarity 
between dyads in nine categories.  
11 http://worldchristiandatabase.org/wcd/default.asp    
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The other two major powers are ranked 11
th (United Kingdom) and 15
th (France). Also, Middle 





th), and Egypt 
(10
th). They have been involved in more conflicts because of religious differences, resources, 
and geopolitical factors. India and Pakistan, wichh differ in major religion and are embroiled in a 
dispute over Kashmir, rank 7
th and 13
th respectively. Thailand (12
th) and the Republic of Korea 
(13
th) are also involved in many conflicts, mostly with adjacent countries. The top 15 countries 
participated in 813 out of 1,458 total MIDs during the period. The table shows that geopolitical 
factors, major power, religion, and oil exports are important factors for military conflicts.  
The regression includes time dummies to control for common effects of external factors such as 
the end of the Cold War. The variable uijt is a random error term. All time-varying variables are 
lagged by 2 years to limit simultaneity problems. 
The data set has a feature of panel structure consisting of 290,040 annual observations 
clustered by 14,190 country pair groups from 1950 to 2000. The number of observations varies 
by year.   
Because a conflict is a binary-choice variable, we use pooled logit model to explain the variable. 
To estimate these systems, we allow for clustering for common country-pair observations of the 
error terms over time.
12 
Summary statistics for the entire data used in the estimation are presented in column (1) in 
Table 3. Of all the observations in the sample, 1,593 country-pairs (about 0.55%) belong to a 
conflict and 288,447 (about 99.45%) to non-conflict or peace. Columns (2) and (3) of Table 1 
report summary statistics for each sub-sample. 
In Table 3, we observe that conflicts have been more frequent among dyads of states sharing a 
common land border or are geographically closer. The mean of contiguity index (the logarithmic 
distance) is higher (smaller) in column (2) than that in column (1).   
The mean of (lagged) bilateral trade interdependence measure in column (2) is three times 
higher than that in column (1), indicating that the bilateral trade between dyads in conflict is 
much higher than the average bilateral trade in the entire sample. On the other hand, the mean 
of (lagged) global trade openness measure in column (2) is slightly smaller than that in column 
(1), which implies that conflicts have occurred more frequently among dyads of states relatively 
more open with each other but less open to the global economy. This casual observation does 
not imply that greater bilateral trade interdependence or lesser global trade openness leads to 
more conflict between dyads. When the relationship between each variable and conflict is 
discussed, the other variables should be appropriately controlled. For example, the shorter 
distance between dyads in conflict naturally leads to greater bilateral trade interdependence and 
smaller global trade openness.    
4. Empirical  Results 
4.1 Basic  Results 
                                                 
12  Similar results are derived from random-effects models, although the bilateral trade interdependence becomes less 
statistically significant. These results are not emphasized here because the conditions needed for the satisfactory 
implementation of random-effects logit models seem unlikely to hold. See Wooldridge (2002).  
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Table 4 presents estimation results for the logit model for the probability of conflict. Consider 
first the results in columns (1)–(3). Column (1) includes bilateral trade interdependence variable. 
Column (2) substitutes the global trade openness for the bilateral trade interdependence. 
Column (3) includes both of these trade integration variables.  
Column (1) of Table 4 shows that the model fits the data well, explaining a substantial part of 
the variation in the occurrence of military conflict. Bilateral distance, contiguity, joint-democracy, 
relative military capabilities, and major-power variables are individually significant at the 1% 
critical level. The significantly negative estimated coefficient for the bilateral distance and the 
significantly positive one for contiguity explain that geographically proximate countries are more 
likely to engage in military conflict. The positive estimate for log difference of GDP supports the 
contention that states unequally balanced in military capability are less likely to engage in 
military conflict. On the other hand, the positive estimated coefficient on major-power variable 
explains that these countries tend to fight more. The negative estimate for joint democracy 
confirms that the probability of military conflicts is significantly lower for dyads composed of 
states that are more democratic.  
In column (1), the estimated coefficients on formal security-alliance, religious similarity and oil 
exporters dummy variables show the signs supporting the theoretical predictions, but turn out to 
be statistically insignificant. Finally, the estimated coefficient on bilateral trade interdependence 
is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level, indicating that bilateral trade dependence 
significantly decreases the probability of military conflicts. Most importantly, this estimation 
result holds true with all other important variables being controlled. For instance, distance 
affects both bilateral trade and conflict probability negatively.
13  
In column (2) of Table 4, the estimated coefficient on global trade openness is negative and 
statistically significant. Dyads of states more dependent on the world economy tend to have 
fewer conflicts than those less dependent. This result contrasts that of Martin et al. (2008) and 
holds quite robust as discussed later. As our specification includes a time dummy variable 
separately, this significant coefficient may not be caused by global factors such as the end of 
Cold War or peace-promotion efforts of international organizations that are common to all 
countries. In this specification, the estimated coefficients on formal security-alliance and oil 
exporters dummy variables turn out to be marginally significant at the 10% and 5% critical levels 
respectively. Oil exporters are involved with military conflicts more frequently. Alliance 
commitments tend to reduce the probability that dyads engage in conflict.   
In column (3) of Table 4, in which both global trade openness and bilateral trade 
interdependence are included, global trade openness has individually significantly negative 
effects at the 1% critical level. The estimated coefficient on bilateral trade interdependence is 
also significant at the 5% critical level. Broadly speaking, both bilateral and global trade 
dependence promote peace between bilateral trade partners. Hence, this result refutes Martin 
et al. (2008)’s argument that countries more open to global trade have a higher probability of 
war by increasing the probability of escalation for proximate countries.    
In the logit model, the dependent variable is defined as the log-odds ratio and the parameters 
do not correspond to the marginal effects of independent variables. The marginal effects can be 
                                                 
13  The omission of distance in the regression yields a biased (toward to a positive value) estimate of the impact of bilateral 
trade interdependence on conflict. A positive estimate of the impact of bilateral trade interdependence on conflicts which was 
obtained often by some researchers such as Barbieri (1996) can be attributed to this bias.   
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calculated at the means of regressors by using the estimate.
14  Then, we can compute the 
response of the probability of military conflict to a one-standard-deviation change of each 
explanatory variable, gauging the relative importance of each explanatory variable in influencing 
the probability of military conflict. 
For example, based on column (3) of Table 4, an increase in the log of bilateral trade 
dependence by one standard deviation of 0.008 (starting from the sample mean) decreases the 
probability of military conflict by 0.019 percentage point, with other variables held constant. On 
the other hand, an increase in the log of global trade openness (by one standard deviation, or 
0.380) decreases the probability of military conflict by 0.109 percentage point. Hence, global 
trade openness, compared with bilateral trade dependence, has a relatively large impact on the 
probability of conflict with the bilateral trade partner.  
Geographic proximity also has a large impact on the probability of military conflict. An increase 
in the log of bilateral distance by 0.824 (its standard deviation) is associated with a decrease of 
the likelihood that a pair of countries is engaged in a conflict by 0.069 percentage point. Since 
the contiguity variable is an indicator variable, its marginal impact is calculated for its change 
from 0 (no common land or distant by sea above 150 miles) to 1 (common border or distant by 
sea up to 150 miles). The corresponding response to this change is an increase in the 
probability of military conflict by 0.421 percentage point. Hence, the probability of a military 
conflict is substantially higher for contiguous countries.  
An increase in the log difference of GDP (by one standard deviation or 1.844) generates an 
increase in the probability of conflict by 0.034 percentage point. The corresponding response to 
an increase in the joint-democracy index (by one standard deviation or 0.331) is by 0.057 
percentage point.   
The marginal impacts of the major-power and oil-exporter variables correspond to the change of 
these dummy variables from 0 to 1. The probability of military conflict increases by 0.29 
percentage point responding to the change in the major-power variable and by 0.064 
percentage point when at least one of dyads is an oil exporter. Hence, the probability of military 
conflict is substantially higher between dyads that involve a major power. The marginal impact 
of religious similarity (by one standard deviation or 0.566) decreases the probability of conflict 
by 0.016 percentage point. 
The empirical technique used assumes that there is no unobserved country-fixed factor. Column 
(4) of Table 4 presents the result from the “conditional” fixed-effects logit estimation technique 
which controls for unobservable country-pair fixed effects. The result with country-pair fixed 
effects show that while most of estimated coefficients show the same signs as those in the 
pooled logit regressions, they are not statistically significant. On the contrary, the estimated 
coefficient on religious similarity becomes larger and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Although fixed-effects estimation is often preferred by many researchers, the fixed-effects 
technique also has drawbacks. Because the fixed-effect estimator exploits only the variation 
over time, the estimates for time-invariant factors such as distance, contiguity, oil-exporters and 
major powers dummy cannot be obtained. By eliminating entire information from cross-section 
                                                 

















′ == = Λ ′ +
. The marginal effect (




) is derived by 
(1 | )





∂= ′′ =Λ −Λ
∂
 (see Greene, 1993, Chapter 21).  
 11
variations, the estimation relies on a smaller information set. In column (4), the sample shrinks 
to only 15,589. In addition, it may exacerbate the bias due to measurement errors in variables. 
A number of previous studies also include the number of peace years (since the last MID) 
variable to the regression to control ‘”temporal dependence” between conflict events.(Beck et al, 
1998) It is suggested that the temporal dependence problem which means an auto-correlated 
binary dependent variable can mislead the result of logit analysis. For instance, military conflicts, 
which can be durable more than a year, can occur with different probability if they are 
subsequent. Column (5) presents the estimation result. Now, the religious similarity variable 
becomes significant at the 5% critical level. Countries whose major religions are similar are less 
involved in conflicts. The estimated coefficients also show that global trade openness has a 
significantly negative effect at the 1% critical level, while bilateral trade interdependence 
variable becomes only marginally significant at the 10% critical level.  
Our specification assumes that the impact of bilateral or global trade openness on the 
probability of military conflict is the same for all country pairs independent of other country-pair 
characteristics. But trade patterns (bilateral and global trade openness) may affect the 
probability of military conflict differently for different subsets of countries, depending in particular 
on the geographical distance between them. For example, the peace-promotion effect of 
bilateral trade interdependence may occur more heavily for geographically closer countries that 
are more likely to be engaged in conflicts. Greater bilateral trade dependence can help prevent 
proximate countries from being escalated into military conflicts. In contrast, it is less clear if 
greater global trade openness reduces the probability of escalation.  
In order to investigate this possibility, a test is conducted on whether the impact of bilateral or 
global trade openness on the probability of military conflict depends on bilateral distance or 
contiguity between dyads.  
First, two interaction terms of bilateral distance with the bilateral and global trade integration 
variables are introduced to the regression. The estimated result in column (6) confirms that the 
impact of bilateral trade openness varies depending on the distance between countries. While 
the estimated coefficient on bilateral trade dependence, (-122.48 s.e.= 25.77) is negative and 
statistically significant, the estimated coefficient on the interactive term between bilateral trade 
interdependence and distance (16.95, s.e.= 3.37) is positive and statistically significant. These 
two estimates combined suggest that the closer two countries are, the greater is the peace-
promotion effect from an increase in bilateral trade. In fact, the overall marginal effect of bilateral 
trade interdependence on the probability of military conflict is negative between proximate 
countries and then positive between distant ones. The two estimated coefficients imply that the 
switch occurs at log of bilateral distance of 7.22 which is below the sample median of 8.88. The 
strong negative relation between bilateral trade interdependence and the probability of military 
conflict in dyads with smaller bilateral distance seems to support the argument that greater 
bilateral trade interdependence can be helpful to prevent disputes—especially between 
geographically closer states—from being escalated into military conflicts. However, the positive 
relation between bilateral trade interdependence and the probability of military conflict in the 
upper range of bilateral distance is puzzling. This may reflect that the strong bilateral trade 
between distant states often comes from more asymmetric trade links, which is often related to 
exploitation and economic conflicts, leading to more military conflicts between them.  
The estimation result in column (6) also confirms that the impact of global trade openness varies 
depending on the distance between countries. The estimated coefficient on the interactive term 
between global trade openness and distance (-0.602, s.e.= 0.21) is significantly negative, while  
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the estimated coefficient on global trade openness, (2.44, s.e.= 1.57), is positive but statistically 
insignificant.
15 The strong peace-promotion effect of global trade openness for all country pairs 
regardless of their geographical distance contrasts the negative relation between bilateral trade 
dependence and peace for the group of geographically distant country pairs. 
The significantly negative interactive term between global trade openness and distance 
indicates that the peace-promotion impact of global trade openness is higher for geographically 
distant countries. An increase in global trade openness likely decreases the probability of 
conflict less for proximate countries than for distant countries. This may reflect that greater 
global trade integration can be more helpful to promote peace for dyads of distant countries 
which likely participate in global conflict, rather than cross-border conflict.  
Column (7) of Table 4 introduces the interaction terms of the bilateral and global trade 
integration variables with contiguity by substituting for their interaction terms with bilateral 
distance. The estimated coefficient on bilateral trade interdependence, (29.34, s.e.= 6.05) is 
significantly positive and the estimated coefficient on the interactive term between bilateral trade 
dependence and contiguity (-47.65, s.e.= 7.85) is significantly negative. 
Hence, the overall effect of bilateral trade dependence on the probability of military conflict 
hinges on contiguity. The peace-promotion effect of bilateral trade dependence appears to be 
significantly higher for contiguous countries. But, the estimates indicate that the relation 
between bilateral trade dependence and the probability of military conflict can be positive in 
non-contiguous countries, which is consistent with the result in column (6).  
On the other hand, the estimated coefficient on the interaction term between contiguity and 
global trade openness (1.69, s.e.= 0.64) is positive and significant. The estimated coefficient on 
global trade openness (-2.78, s.e.= 0.52), is significantly negative. Hence, the two estimated 
coefficients imply that the overall marginal effect of global trade openness on the probability of 
military conflict is always negative for countries regardless of contiguity between them. Greater 
global trade integration can help to promote peace for all dyads, which is also consistent with 
the result in column (6). 
Column (8) presents the estimation result of the specification in which all four interactive terms 
are included. In this specification, the estimated coefficients on bilateral trade interdependence, 
(-29.05, s.e.= 36.61) and global trade openness (0.51, s.e.= 2.21) become statistically 
insignificant. For the two interactive terms with bilateral trade dependence, only the interactive 
term between bilateral trade dependence and contiguity (-34.37, s.e.= 10.01) is negative and 
highly significant. Hence, the estimated result confirms that the overall impact of bilateral and 
global trade openness vary depending on the distance between countries.   
4.2  Robustness of the Results 
The robustness of the basic results of Table 4—about the effect of bilateral and global trade 
dependence on conflict—is checked. Table 5 considers other possible determinants of military 
interstate conflict, many of which have been proposed in previous studies. These additional 
variables are added to the basic specification for the MID in column (5) of Table 4.   
                                                 
15  The two point estimates for global trade and its interaction terms imply that the overall marginal effect of global trade 
openness on the probability of military conflict is negative for almost entire range of the sample. Only for the countries of 
which bilateral distance ranges below 4.05, which is less than 0.05% of the dyads in the sample, the marginal impact of 
global trade openness can be positive.  
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First, we control the possible spillover effects of military conflicts. The existence of other 
conflicts at the same time can influence both an occurrence of a bilateral military conflict and 
bilateral trade flows between a dyad of states. Column (1) of Table 4 includes as an additional 
explanatory variable the total number of MID that the countries of the dyad are involved in. It 
shows that the estimated coefficients on all trade variables remain significant. 
Column (2) includes a dummy for all country pairs for which there was no trade between them to 
control whether or not the two countries have an economic relationship. The zero-trade dummy 
variable becomes significantly negative, but does not have any significant impact on other 
estimated coefficients. 
Column (3) adds an index for common language and column (4) adds a dummy variable for 
country pairs with a history of colonialization to control for cultural and/or historical factors that 
might affect the occurrence of conflicts. It is found that these additional variables tend to make 
the bilateral trade interdependence variable statistically insignificant. This may be due partly 
from the significant correlation between these additional variables and bilateral trade.   
Column (5) adds the measure of political proximity between two countries as a possible 
determinant of military conflicts. It is the “affinity of nations’” index (Gartzke, 2000), which is 
constructed by using UN voting data.
16  It is assumed that when the UN voting patterns of two 
nations are more alike, their political interests would be more similar. The index ranges from -1 
(most dissimilar) to 1 (most similar). The variable appears significantly negative, indicating that 
countries that share similar political interests are less likely to engage in military conflicts. 
Column (6) includes cubic splines of the number of peace years to further control for the 
potential “temporal dependence” problem. An occurrence of a military conflict not only can have 
an immediate impact on bilateral trade, but also can influence on the probability of military 
conflicts at any future moment. Beck et al.(1998) suggest to add cubic splines of the number of 
peace years, as well as the number of peace years variable, to correct for a temporal 
dependence bias.
17 The estimation result shows that the inclusion of the cubic splines does not 
cause any significant change in the estimated coefficients. 
The next three columns present the results with the interaction terms with bilateral distance 
(column 6) and with contiguity (column 7). The estimated coefficients on the interactive terms 
are statistically significant and the main results in the basic specifications in Table 4 still hold. 
For our purposes, an important finding is that the role of bilateral and global trade integration on 
military conflict—often after interacting with geographical proximity between countries—is robust 
to the introduction of these additional variables.   
In order to minimize the simultaneous correlation problem between trade variables and military 
disputes, columns (1)–(4) of Table 6 present estimation results with 3-year lagged trade 
integration variables. The main results are similar to those in Table 4. But, the 3-year lagged 
bilateral trade interdependence variable becomes insignificant in column (1) of Table 6.   
                                                 
16  We use data on UN roll-call votes on resolution in the United Nations General Assembly collected by Erik Voeten 
(http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/ev42/UNvoting.htm). Alesina and Dollar (2000) and Barro and Lee (2005) used the UN 
voting data to investigate the influence of the US and major powers on foreign-aid and IMF lending decisions.  
17  The other solution is including dummy variable  ( 1,2,...) Kt t =  which is coded as 1 according to the length (t) of sequence of 
zeros that precede the current observations. This is exactly the same as including every lagged dependent variable.  
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Also investigated were different trade integration measures, including the log of arithmetic 
averages, rather than geometric averages, of bilateral or global trade integration of the two 
countries.
 18 The estimation results of Columns (5)–(8) in Table 6 show that they are very similar 
to those in Tables 4 and 5.   
4.3  Instrument Variable Estimation 
The empirical investigation of the effects of trade integration on military conflicts encounters 
standard endogeneity problems. The causality can run in the opposite direction: military conflicts 
have a negative effect on trade (Glick and Taylor, 2006, Blomberg and Hess, 2006, and Martin 
et al. 2008). It is also plausible that the negative effects of trade may reflect any omitted dyadic 
characteristics that influence the probability of military conflicts. The logit estimates may not 
therefore reveal the true effect of trade integration on military conflicts. We have used lagged 
trade variables to reduce endogeneity of trade as an explanation of military conflicts to the 
certain extent.  
In this section, we implement an instrument variable approach to control potential endogeneity 
problems. We use as instrument variables the Generalized System of Preference (GSP) 
scheme interacted with distance and an index of economic remoteness measure of dyads as 
suggested by Martin et al. (2008) and add one more instrument variable.  
The Generalized System of Preference (GSP) scheme is tariff preferences granted by 
developed countries to developing countries. Romalis (2003) shows that GSP program 
increases Least Developed Countries’ (LDC) trade significantly by facilitating LDC’s access to 
markets of rich and distant developed countries. We choose European Union (EU) GSP 
schemes and multiply it by the geographical proximity from EU member countries to the 
recipients of the EU GSP program. We lag this variable by 4 years. GSP participation is 
expected to increase global trade openness while its relation to bilateral trade is ambiguous due 
to the distance multiplier.    
The second instrumental variable is the measure of remoteness of dyads from the rest of world. 
This variable is routinely used in trade literature as an important determinant of bilateral trade 
flows (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004, and Baier and Bergstrand, 2004).
19  When 
constructing the remoteness variable, we exclude any third country k which had military conflicts 
with one of dyads at any moment in history.  We also lag this variable by 2 years. An increase in 
remoteness of dyads is expected to increase bilateral trade of dyads, but decreases global trade.   
The third instrumental variable is the number of trading countries of dyads (lagged by 2 years). 
This new variable is added to strengthen the validity of instrumental variable estimation. This 
variable is constructed by adding up the number of each country’s trading partners whose trade 
flow is not missing and greater than zero. In counting the number of trading partners, we 
exclude any third country k which had military conflicts with one of dyads at any moment in 
history. If a country trades with a larger number of partners, its global trade integration is 
expected to be larger. On the contrary, an increase in total trading partners of dyads can have 
                                                 
18  To keep the zero observations when making the log transformation of bilateral trade dependence measure, we use log (1+x).  
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∑∑  This variable is time variant because new 
countries have generated almost every year during the period from 1950 to 2000. Alesina et al.(2000) show the number of 
countries in world has drastically increased from 1950 to 2000.(74 countries in 1946 to 192 in 2000). 
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an ambiguous effect on bilateral trade: it can divert the bilateral trade between two countries to 
other global partners so that bilateral trade decreases, while an increase in the number of 
trading partners of dyads implies that dyads are integrated more with global markets and thus 
their overall trade volume increases.  
Because there is no standard IV estimation methodology in the logit framework with clustered 
dyads, we follow one of solutions provided by Wooldridge (2001), which is to use an IV linear 
probability model with clustered errors. The logit model is non-linear, so we also use an IV probit 
model to check robustness of the instrumental variable approach and to reinforce the results.   
Table 7 shows the first stage regression of IV estimation. Columns (1) and (2) show the 
instrumentation of GSP, remoteness and number of trading partners on bilateral trade 
interdependence and global trade openness respectively. As expected, GSP has a positive 
effect on global trade openness. Remoteness has a significantly positive effect on bilateral trade 
dependence and a significantly negative effect on global trade openness. The estimates of 
number of trading partners on bilateral trade and global trade integration are both significantly 
positive. Both F-test statistics on the joint-null effect of the three instruments are 14.25 (on 
bilateral dependence) and 35.07 (on global trade openness) and exceed 10, the threshold 
number recommended by Staiger and Stock (1997). Thus, we can reject the hypothesis that the 
IV equation is weakly identified and confirm that the instruments are theoretically and 
statistically powerful.   
Table 8 presents the results of second stage instrumental variable (IV) regressions. Column (1) 
of Table 8 show the results of IV linear probability model regressions and column (2) display the 
result of IV probit regressions using the clustered bootstrap method.
20 The results are broadly 
consistent with the logit estimation results. Column (1) shows that an increase in both bilateral 
trade interdependence and global trade openness significantly promotes peace respectively at 
5% and 1% critical levels. Column (2) also shows global trade integration reduces the 
probability of conflicts and other coefficients are qualitatively same as column (1). Hence, the 
negative effects of trade integration on military conflicts in the logit estimation do not reflect the 
reverse causality that runs from military conflicts to trade or the influence of any omitted 
characteristics. 
Columns (3) and (4) add the interactive terms of bilateral and global trade openness with the 
geographical proximity variables. The IV estimation results broadly support the basic result of 
logit estimation by confirming that the coefficients of bilateral and global trade openness 
depending on the geographical proximity of countries are also qualitatively the same as the 
coefficients of logit model.  
We find no evidence of an over-identification problem. The joint-null hypothesis for Sargan-
Hansen’s over-identification test, which implies that instruments are uncorrelated with the error 
                                                 
20  IV probit estimation with clustered standard errors is not feasible in this case. Therefore, we use clustered bootstrap method, 
which constructs a number of resamples of the observed data by dyads(clustered pairs) and then estimates by IV probit 
method. The bootstrap method is useful in reducing a finite sample bias. But it is also used to get statistical inference of the 
model when parametric inference is impossible or requires complicated formulas for calculating standard errors (Horowitz 
2001).    
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term, cannot be rejected. The test statistics is 1.449 (p-value is 0.221) in case of specification of 
column (1) supports the exogeneity hypothesis of our instruments.
21  
5.  The Impact of Military Interstate Disputes on Trade Integration 
We assess the effect of trade integration on military conflicts and find that both bilateral and 
global trade integration contribute to peace. However, the reverse causal effect from military 
conflicts to trade integration remains an issue. A number of studies have assessed the effect of 
military conflicts on bilateral trade flows (Glick and Taylor, 2006, Blomberg and Hess, 2006, and 
Martin et al. 2008), whereas how much military conflicts between countries affect multilateral 
trade of the states concerned has not been investigated to the same extent. This section 
analyzes the effect of military conflicts on bilateral and global trade integration. We adopt the 
gravity model analysis to evaluate the trade effects of military conflicts (Anderson and van 
Wincoop 2003). The extended gravity model of bilateral trade takes the following form.  
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k
Trade Integration MID X Year u αβ γδ −
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where the dependent variable is a measure of bilateral trade interdependence of a dyad of 
states i and j. MIDt-k(k=0,…5) are military conflict variables including from contemporaneous 
conflict to 5-year lagged conflict, and Yeart denotes a set of binary variables which are unity in 
the specific year t. Xijt includes other control variables shown in the gravity equation. They 
include square root of product real GDP of dyads, square root of product of real GDP per 
capita,
22 geographical proximity (distance, contiguity) of dyads, common language, and colonial 
relationship dummy variables such as common colonizers and existence of a colonial 
relationship. The specification also has a Regional Trade Agreement (RTA) dummy, a binary 
variable which is unity if i and j belong to the same RTA, and a GATT membership dummy as 
coded 1 if two countries are both GATT signatories at observation year(t). GSP dummy is also 
added. Lastly, we add the remoteness, and the number of trading partners, which were used as 
instruments for bilateral trade in the previous section. 
                                                 
21  Other over-identification test also cannot reject the null hypothesis. The J statistics of Sargan-Hansen test are 2.063(p-
value=0.356) in column (3) and 4.886(p-value=0.1) in column (4). 
22  A more detailed discussion of the gravity model is in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003).   
From equation (13) in Anderson and van Wincoop(2003), 
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which shows why we include square root of product of GDP of i and j.  
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Table 9 shows the estimation results of regressing bilateral trade interdependence on military 
conflicts and other controls. We apply two different estimation techniques.
23  Column (1) is 
estimated by pooled OLS allowing for clustering of common country-pair error terms over time 
and column (2) is the result by the fixed-effects estimation controlling for unobserved country-
pair fixed effects. Both columns (1) and (2) display very similar results. First of all, the results 
confirm that the significant negative effects of military conflicts on bilateral trade integration. In 
column (1), the coefficients of all military conflict variables are significantly negative. The 
estimates imply that during a bilateral military conflict, bilateral trade integration declines by 
0.007 over the next 5  years, which much bigger than the predicted mean of bilateral trade 
dependence, 0.002.
24 As a matter of fact, 94% of dyads have lower bilateral trade dependence 
than 0.007 so that these country dyads would lose all trade between them if a military conflict 
occurred and lasted over 5 years. In column (2), with the adoption of the fixed-effects estimation, 
the effects of military conflicts on bilateral trade become smaller, but most of the estimated 
coefficients are still negative and statistically significant.  
We also find that the conventional variables behave very much the same way as the model 
predicts, and the estimated coefficients are statistically significant. The estimated coefficients on 
the RTA membership dummy in both columns (1) and (2) are positive and statistically significant. 
The estimated coefficient on the GATT membership dummy is also positive, but statistically 
significant only in the fixed-effect estimation. 
We slightly change the specification of gravity model in (2) in order to analyze the effect of 
military conflicts on global trade integration. The dependent variable is a measure of global 
trade integration of dyads. The specification follows the basic gravity equation with 
contemporaneous and lagged military conflicts. For the other control variables, we alter some 
bilateral variables to have more direct relationship with global trade pattern of dyads.  
For example, we include square root of product of real GDP (and GDP per capita) with all other 







× ∑∑ ). 
25 The GATT dummy variable is coded as 1 
when only one country in any dyad is a GATT member. This is because a country of any dyad 
that joins GATT is likely to trade more with other GATT members. Thus, we can expect this 
dummy variable to be positively related to global trade integration. We also include the sum of 
the number of countries using a common language with i and j. This variable controls cultural 
proximity of each country in a dyad with other countries, which can be related to the global trade 
                                                 
23  We also implement tobit estimation method to control zero bilateral trade (left-censored) and get qualitatively same results. 
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cost of each country in the dyad. The number of other conflicts in t is included to control the 
externality of conflicts among countries that could affect a dyad’s global trade integration. The 
specification also includes each country’s remoteness, and the number of trading partners, and 
the EU GSP with distance variables that were used as instruments for global trade as outlined in 
the previous section. 
Table 10 displays the estimation results of global trade integration on military conflicts and other 
controls. We find that military conflicts have a negative effect on global trade integration. In 
column (1), the estimated coefficients of all military conflicts are significantly negative. This 
implies that a bilateral military conflict of a dyad reduces global (multilateral) trade integration by 
0.16 over the ensuing 5 years, which means global trade integration decreases by 30%
26 if a 
military conflict between countries occurred and lasted over 5 years. In the fixed-effect 
estimation of column (2), the estimated coefficients on one and two lagged military conflicts are 
statistically significant individually. The coefficients of other military conflict variables are 
negative but become statistically insignificant. The estimation results of other control variables 
confirm our predictions. The estimated coefficients on the square root of real GDP or GDP per 
capita of trading-partner variables are statistically significant. The estimated coefficients on the 
one GATT membership dummy are also positive and statistically significant—a country’s 
participation in GATT makes their trade increase with other GATT members while decreasing 
trade with non-GATT members. Lastly, the coefficients on the number of countries with common 
languages are significantly positive, which coincide with the conventional positive effect of 
common language on trade. 
6. Concluding  Remarks 
The empirical analysis shows that an increase in bilateral trade interdependence and global 
trade openness significantly reduces the probability of military conflict between countries. Our 
empirical results are robust when controlling for the simultaneous determination of trade and 
peace.   
Our results also support that the peace-promotion effect of trade varies depending on the 
geographical proximity between countries. Greater bilateral trade interdependence appears to 
bring about a considerably larger peace-promotion effect for neighboring countries. In contrast, 
greater global trade openness has a more significantly positive effect on peace for distant 
countries than it does on neighboring ones.  
Overall, our results consistently show that trade integration has an important effect on conflict 
between states. A recent seminal paper in global trade and conflict (Martin et al, 2008) argues 
that globalization (increase in multilateral trade) can increase the probability of military conflict 
by reducing the bilateral dependence to any given country. Our empirical findings largely refute 
this argument. It is evident that greater global trade openness is helpful in promoting peace. 
Future research is needed to define the exact channels through which global trade openness 
promotes interstate peace.  



















Our findings suggest that trade integration not merely results in economic gains but can bring 
about significant political gains as well—such as a peace dividend between trading partners. It 
also explains why regional or global economic integration are often initiated to satisfy political and 
security motives. For example, the raison d’etre behind the formation of the European Union 
following the Second World War was the desire for peace—particularly between France and 
Germany. Further research on quantitative assessments of peace dividends resulting from 
economic integration would be of great interest.   
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Table 1: Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1950–2000 
Full Sample  Regression Sample 
Pair-year Pair-year 





   All dyads  572246  290040 
Non-Fighting dyads  569841     288447 
           
Fighting(MID) dyads  2405  100.00   1593  100.00 
2 (Threat to use force)  119  4.95   81  5.08  
3 (Display of Force)  528  21.95   420  26.37  
4 (Use of force)  1494  62.12   1017  63.84  
Hostility 
level 
5 (War)  264  10.98   75  4.71  
 
Source: Constructed from the Database of the “Correlates Of War (COW)” project with Maoz correction, Zeev Maoz  (2005). Dyadic 
MID Dataset (version 2.0): http://psfaculty.ucdavis.edu/zmaoz/dyadmid.html 
 
 
Table 2: Top 15 Countries That are Most Frequently Involved in the Militarized Interstate 
Disputes (MID), 1950–2000 
5 4  3  2 
No  Country  # of MIDs
(War)  (Use of Force) (Display  
of Force)  (Threats) 
The country’s 
participation in 
total MID events 
(%) 
1 United  States  160  3  55  92  10  10.97 
2 USSR/Russia    119  1  61  47  10  8.16 
3  China, People’s Rep. of  113  4  73  28  8  7.75 
4 Iran  105  1  83  18  3  7.20 
5 Israel  95  5  69  18  3  6.52 
6 Iraq  84  3  69  11  1  5.76 
7 India  72  3  44  19  6  4.94 
8 Syria  68  4  51  12  1  4.66 
9 Turkey  61  2  33  17  9  4.18 
10 Egypt  60  5  33  19  3  4.12 
11 United  Kingdom  57  4  23  25  5  3.91 
12 Thailand  46  2  27  14  3  3.16 
13 Pakistan  45  2  35  5  3  3.09 
13  Korea, Republic of  45  2  36  6  1  3.09 
15 France  41  3  22  13  3  2.81  
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Table 3: Summary Statistics 
 
(1) All  (2) Conflict   (3) No-Conflict     
(N=290,040) (N=1593)  (N=288,447) 
Variable Mean  Median  Std. 
 Dev.  Mean  Std. 
Dev  Mean  Std. 
Dev. 
Military Interstate Disputes  0.0055   0   0.0739   1   0   0   0 
Bilateral trade dependence 
 (2 years lagged)  0.002 0.00029  0.0082   0.0056    0.0134   0.0019   0.0081 
Global trade openness  
(2 years lagged)  0.4880   0.4219  0.3798   0.3338   0.2667   0.4888   0.3801 
Contiguity  0.0377   0  0.1904   0.5895   0.4921   0.0346   0.1828 
Distance (log)  8.6172   8.8794  0.8238   7.3595   1.2418   8.6241   0.8155 
Log difference of GDP  
(2 years lagged)  2.5135   2.1633  1.8437   2.1562   1.6900   2.5154   1.8444 
Major powers dummy  0.0961   0  0.2948   0.3522   0.4778   0.0947   0.2928 
Joint democracy index  
(2 years lagged)  0.3088   0.15  0.3313   0.2014   0.2531   0.3094   0.3316 
Alliance  
(2 years lagged)  0.0919   0   0.2889   0.2555   0.4363   0.0910   0.2877 
Religious Similarity  
(2 years lagged)  -0.2316   -0.349   0.5662   0.0356   0.6123   -0.2331   0.5656 
  Oil exporters dummy  0.1603  0  0.3668 0.2140  0.4101 0.1602  0.3667
Number of Peace years  22.2887   22  13.0996   6.0891   10.7993   22.3782  13.0556
 








Table 4:  Determinants of Militarized Interstate Disputes 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
-18.643**   -15.771** -2.896  -8.495* -122.479***  29.347*** -29.049  Bilateral trade 
dependence(t-2) 
[7.959]   [7.504]  [4.364]  [5.063] [25.769]  [6.045] [36.611] 
 -2.037*** -1.933*** 0.216  -1.836*** 2.439 -2.778*** 0.511  Global trade  
Openness (t-2)   [0.463]  [0.457]  [0.178]  [0.370] [1.567]  [0.521] [2.236] 
2.990*** 2.748*** 2.802***   2.112*** 2.081*** 1.822*** 1.972***  Contiguity 
[0.242] [0.225]  [0.227]    [0.184] [0.183]  [0.273] [0.306] 
-0.517*** -0.547*** -0.574***   -0.475*** -0.310*** -0.419*** -0.314*** Distance(log) 
[0.084] [0.084]  [0.087]    [0.077] [0.114]  [0.076] [0.115] 
-0.123*** -0.116*** -0.122*** 0.106** -0.115*** -0.116*** -0.119*** -0.116*** Log difference  
of GDP (t-2)  [0.042] [0.042]  [0.042] [0.053] [0.032]  [0.031] [0.031] [0.031] 
2.213*** 1.847*** 1.950***   1.852*** 1.706*** 1.749*** 1.699***  Major powers 
[0.201] [0.209]  [0.203]    [0.170] [0.160]  [0.163] [0.158] 
-1.268*** -1.366*** -1.157*** -0.875*** -1.022*** -0.967*** -0.965*** -0.952*** Joint democracy 
Index (t-2)  [0.288] [0.264]  [0.284] [0.204] [0.214]  [0.206] [0.202] [0.202] 
-0.318 -0.341*  -0.281 -0.148 0.191  0.159 0.149 0.152  Alliance(t-2) 
[0.197] [0.193]  [0.192] [0.142] [0.152]  [0.148] [0.142] [0.143] 
Religious Similarity  -0.189 -0.185  -0.188  -2.507*** -0.276** -0.287** -0.291** -0.290** 
(t-2)  [0.164] [0.161]  [0.159] [0.458] [0.127]  [0.125] [0.123] [0.123] 
0.235 0.408** 0.430**    0.456*** 0.414*** 0.400*** 0.405***  Oil exporters  
dummy  [0.171] [0.172]  [0.172]    [0.137] [0.138]  [0.136] [0.137] 
      -0.135*** -0.134***  -0.133***  -0.133*** Number of Peace 
years        [0.008]  [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] 
       16.950***    7.078  Distance(log)× 
Bilateral trade 
dependence         [3.365]    [4.375] 
Distance(log)          -0.602***    -0.409 
× Global openness         [0.214]    [0.264] 





dependence           [7.851]  [10.007] 
Contiguity            1.692***  0.938 
× Global openness           [0.639]  [0.808] 
   Logit  Logit  Logit  Panel FE
Logit  Logit Logit  Logit  Logit 
Observations 290040  290040  290040  15589  290040  290040  290040  290040 
Pseuo-R
2 0.281  0.285  0.289  -  0.38 0.385 0.384  0.389 
 
Note: The dependent variable is a binary variable for a militarized conflict between a dyad of states. All time-varying explanatory 
variables are lagged by two years. The summary statistics for all variables are shown in Table 3.  For columns (1) to (8) except 
column (4), the pooled logit estimation techniques were applied to 290,040 country pairs in total over the period from 1950 to 2000. 
The estimation allows for clustering of the error terms over time for country pairs. Column (4) uses conditional fixed effect logit 
estimation method. Clustered robust standard errors of the estimated coefficients are reported in bracket. Intercept and year dummy 
variables are included (not reported). ***, ** and * indicate that the estimated coefficients are statistically significant at 1 %, 5 %, and 
10% respectively.  
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Table 5: Robustness Check I (Inclusion of other variables) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
-8.495* -9.562*  -8.152  -7.192  -7.279 -4.558  -92.092***  25.607*** Bilateral trade 
dependence(t-2)  [5.063] [5.133] [5.522] [5.108] [5.282] [4.936] [25.334] [5.781] 
-1.836*** -1.863*** -1.946*** -1.907*** -1.653*** -1.010*** 1.777 -1.801*** Global trade 
openness (t-2)  [0.370] [0.371] [0.420] [0.416] [0.390] [0.357] [1.187] [0.546] 
2.112*** 2.093*** 2.105*** 2.076*** 2.202*** 1.906*** 1.881*** 1.691*** Contiguity 
[0.184] [0.182] [0.196] [0.193] [0.196] [0.197] [0.197] [0.265] 
-0.475*** -0.465*** -0.355*** -0.367*** -0.468*** -0.384*** -0.282*** -0.355*** Distance(Log) 
[0.077] [0.078] [0.067] [0.064] [0.072] [0.079] [0.101] [0.076] 
-0.115*** -0.120*** -0.120*** -0.123*** -0.099*** -0.061** -0.060** -0.065**  Log difference  
of GDP(t-2)  [0.032] [0.032] [0.035] [0.035] [0.031] [0.030] [0.030] [0.029] 
1.852*** 1.808*** 1.837*** 1.779*** 1.454*** 1.304*** 1.214*** 1.234*** Major powers dummy 
[0.170] [0.167] [0.178] [0.183] [0.184] [0.169] [0.164] [0.164] 
-1.022*** -1.065*** -1.017*** -1.019*** -0.972*** -1.133*** -1.094*** -1.068*** Joint democracy 
index (t-2)  [0.214] [0.214] [0.219] [0.221] [0.226] [0.211] [0.208] [0.206] 
0.191 0.189 0.221 0.285* 0.400*** 0.327** 0.313** 0.305**  Alliance (t-2) 
[0.152] [0.150] [0.156] [0.146] [0.152] [0.138] [0.138] [0.131] 
-0.276** -0.280** -0.349** -0.266** -0.198  -0.176  -0.194  -0.194  Religious Similarity 
(t-2)  [0.127] [0.126] [0.150] [0.130] [0.143] [0.136] [0.136] [0.135] 
0.456*** 0.442*** 0.518*** 0.512*** 0.480*** 0.394*** 0.362*** 0.355*** Oil exporters dummy 
[0.137] [0.137] [0.142] [0.140] [0.135] [0.120] [0.119] [0.118] 
-0.135*** -0.136*** -0.139*** -0.139*** -0.122*** -0.615*** -0.610*** -0.605*** Number of peace 
years  [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.007] [0.034] [0.033] [0.033] 
0.036***        0.035***  0.037***  0.037*** Number of other 
conflicts in t  [0.005]       [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] 
 -0.549***       -0.232  -0.219  -0.222  Zero trade dummy (t-
2)   [0.173]      [0.180] [0.183] [0.183] 
   0.371**     0.177  0.177  0.184  Common language 
   [0.172]    [0.166] [0.165] [0.162] 
     0.22  0.22  0.148  0.067  Pair ever  
in colonial 
relationship      [0.350]    [0.287] [0.272] [0.279] 
     -1.019*** -0.854***  -0.796***  -0.833*** UN voting  
     [0.194]  [0.174] [0.169] [0.169] 
      5.329***  5.298***  5.255*** Spline(1) 
      [0.396]  [0.391]  [0.396] 
      -10.344***  -10.294***  -10.212*** Spline(2) 
      [0.817]  [0.810]  [0.817] 
      6.951***  6.932***  6.873*** Spline(3) 
      [0.651]  [0.650]  [0.654] 
       12.948***    Distance(log)× 
Bilateral trade 
dependence         [3.170]   
Distance(log)         -0.402**   
× Global openness              [0.168]   
        -38.847*** Contiguity × Bilateral 
trade dependence          [7.262] 
Contiguity          1.238** 
× Global openness                [0.595] 
Observations  290040 290040 255091 255091 262043 235477 235477 235477 
Pseuo-R
2 0.378  0.38  0.372  0.371  0.373 0.428 0.432 0.432 
 
Note: Clustered robust standard errors are reported in bracket. Intercept and year dummy variables are included (not reported).  
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Table 6: Robustness Check II (Other trade integration measurements) 
 
  3 Years Lagged Trade Variables  Other Trade Dependence 
(arithmetic average) 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
-7.06 -3.647  -92.907*** 26.993*** -1.389 -0.76  -16.548*** 2.542*** Bilateral trade 
dependence  [5.418] [4.831]  [25.321] [5.544] [1.039] [1.035] [4.313] [0.418] 
-1.838*** -0.934** 2.432*  -2.137*** -0.672*** -0.478*** 0.387 -0.697*** Global trade  
openness  [0.417] [0.421] [1.324] [0.683] [0.113] [0.106] [0.518] [0.126] 
2.027*** 1.811*** 1.786*** 1.410*** 2.062*** 1.852*** 1.866*** 2.232*** Contiguity 
[0.184] [0.197] [0.196] [0.296] [0.185] [0.193] [0.196] [0.229] 
-0.444*** -0.359*** -0.228** -0.323*** -0.484*** -0.396*** -0.468*** -0.376*** Distance(Log) 
[0.075] [0.077] [0.106] [0.073] [0.075] [0.078] [0.096] [0.080] 
-0.126*** -0.068** -0.067** -0.075*** -0.088*** -0.044 -0.053*  -0.069** Log difference  
of GDP  [0.031] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.032] [0.031] [0.031] [0.030] 
1.728*** 1.264*** 1.157*** 1.169*** 1.766*** 1.213*** 1.196*** 1.212*** Major powers  
dummy  [0.169] [0.172] [0.167] [0.166] [0.172] [0.168] [0.169] [0.170] 
-0.903*** -0.973*** -0.934*** -0.904*** -1.021*** -1.129*** -1.038*** -1.012*** Joint democracy  
index  [0.208] [0.200] [0.199] [0.195] [0.214] [0.211] [0.205] [0.204] 
0.173 0.225* 0.207  0.187  0.124 0.288**  0.275** 0.247*  Alliance 
[0.149] [0.136] [0.135] [0.128] [0.154] [0.137] [0.137] [0.128] 
-0.267** -0.175  -0.196  -0.202 -0.277** -0.166 -0.175  -0.18  Religious Similarity 
[0.125] [0.129] [0.129] [0.129] [0.129] [0.133] [0.132] [0.131] 
0.454*** 0.425*** 0.389*** 0.380*** 0.472*** 0.431*** 0.426*** 0.413*** Oil exporters  
dummy  [0.135] [0.118] [0.117] [0.114] [0.141] [0.122] [0.123] [0.121] 
-0.138*** -0.598*** -0.593*** -0.588*** -0.136*** -0.613*** -0.608*** -0.601*** Number of  
peace years  [0.008] [0.032] [0.031] [0.031] [0.008] [0.033] [0.033] [0.034] 
 0.033*** 0.035*** 0.036***  0.036***  0.037***  0.038*** Number of other  
conflicts in t   [0.009]  [0.009]  [0.009]  [0.009]  [0.009]  [0.009] 
 -0.235  -0.217  -0.221  -0.221  -0.232  -0.245  Zero trade  
dummy   [0.207]  [0.210]  [0.211]  [0.179]  [0.182]  [0.183] 
 0.166  0.168  0.178  0.184  0.176  0.181  Common language 
 [0.161]  [0.161]  [0.158]  [0.164]  [0.164]  [0.160] 
 0.244  0.169  0.104  0.255  0.242  0.143  Pair ever in  
colonial relationship   [0.274]  [0.256]  [0.265]  [0.286]  [0.273]  [0.277] 
 -0.712*** -0.656*** -0.692***  -0.853***  -0.810***  -0.822*** UN voting  
 [0.165]  [0.159]  [0.159]  [0.173]  [0.172]  [0.170] 
 4.952*** 4.925*** 4.891***  5.307***  5.277***  5.216*** Spline(1) 
 [0.369]  [0.366]  [0.370]  [0.391]  [0.393]  [0.397] 
 -9.517*** -9.474*** -9.411***   -10.307*** -10.249*** -10.127*** Spline(2) 
 [0.766]  [0.763]  [0.770]  [0.808]  [0.811]  [0.820] 
 6.271*** 6.253*** 6.209***  6.935***  6.894***  6.798*** Spline(3) 
 [0.624]  [0.625]  [0.628]  [0.647]  [0.649]  [0.655] 
   13.231***     2.038***    Distance(log)× 
Bilateral trade 
dependence     [3.134]      [0.470]   
   -0.488***     -0.116*    Distance(log) 
× Global openness      [0.187]        [0.066]   
    -38.929***     -7.551*** Contiguity ×  
Bilateral trade 
dependence      [6.945]      [1.447] 
    1.835***     0.381**  Contiguity 
× Global openness      [0.703]      [0.162] 
Observations  265646 216877 216877 216877 290040 235477  235477 235477 
 
Note: trade openness measures from column (5) to (8) are constructed by log of the arithmetic averages, rather than the geometric 
averages, of bilateral or global trade openness of the two countries.  
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Table 7: Instrument Variable Estimation: First Stage Regression  
 
Dependent Variables  Bilateral Trade Dependence Global Trade Openness















Log difference of GDP(t-2) 
[0.00003] [0.0021] 
0.0034*** -0.1531*** 
Major powers dummy 
[0.0004] [0.0076] 
0.002*** 0.0437*** 









Oil exporters dummy 
[0.0002] [0.0068] 
0.0002** 0.0233*** 
Number of peace years 
[0.00007] [0.0018] 
-0.0002** -0.0007 
Number of other conflicts in t 
[0.00009] [0.0023] 
-0.0005 0.0735*** 





0.0064*** -0.0522***  Pair ever in colonial 




14.25 35.07  F-test on IVs 
Observations  229542 229542 
R-square 0.1745  0.1337 
 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by dyads are in parentheses. All regressions include 
unreported year dummies and cublic splines of number of peace years. The first stage regressions 
which include interaction terms with distance and contiguity are similar with the above result. 





Table 8: Instrument Variable Estimation: Second Stage IV Regression  
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
-1.511** -34.274 -6.596*  -1.092  Bilateral trade dependence(t-2) 
[0.631] [35.228] [3.643] [1.771] 
-0.043*** -1.494*  0.003  -0.047***  Global trade openness(t-2) 
[0.014] [0.776] [0.101] [0.014] 
0.06*** 0.883*** 0.06***  0.109  Contiguity 
[0.008] [0.275] [0.009] [0.067] 
-0.005*** -0.267***  -0.003  -0.005**  Distance(Log) 
[0.001] [0.060] [0.006] [0.002] 
-0.0001 -0.02 0.0001  -0.00002  Log difference of GDP(t-2) 
[0.0002] [0.014] [0.0002] [0.0002] 
0.006* 0.451** -0.001  0.004  Major powers dummy 
[0.003] [0.186] [0.004] [0.004] 
-0.0004 -0.265**  -0.001  -0.0005  Joint democracy index(t-2) 
[0.002] [0.110] [0.002] [0.002] 
-0.002 0.074  -0.005**  -0.003  Alliance(t-2) 
[0.002] [0.076] [0.002] [0.003] 
-0.002*** -0.092* -0.001** -0.002**  Religious Similarity(t-2) 
[0.001] [0.049] [0.001] [0.001] 
0.005*** 0.261***  0.004  0.006*  Oil exporters dummy 
[0.002] [0.082] [0.002] [0.003] 
-0.021*** -0.256*** -0.020*** -0.020***  Number of peace years 
[0.002] [0.022] [0.002] [0.002] 
0.025*** 0.020*** 0.024*** 0.024***  Number of other conflicts in t 
[0.002] [0.008] [0.002] [0.002] 
0.003** -0.002  0.006*** 0.004  Zero trade dummy(t-2) 
[0.001] [0.100] [0.002] [0.002] 
0.005*** 0.148* 0.006***  0.006***  Common language 
[0.002] [0.085] [0.001] [0.001] 
0.007 0.223 -0.005 0.003  Pair ever in colonial 
relationship  [0.007] [0.291] [0.008] [0.008] 
-0.005*** -0.284***  -0.003*  -0.005***  UN voting (t-2) 
[0.001] [0.067] [0.002] [0.002] 
0.171*** 2.096*** 0.162*** 0.165***  Spline(1) 
[0.015] [0.212] [0.015] [0.014] 
-0.315*** -4.009*** -0.298*** -0.303***  Spline(2) 
[0.027] [0.398] [0.027] [0.025] 
0.176*** 2.601*** 0.167*** 0.170***  Spline(3) 
[0.015] [0.261] [0.015] [0.014] 
   0.829    Distance(log)×Bilateral trade 
dependence     [0.550]   
Distance(log)     -0.007   
× Global openness      [0.012]   
    -0.257  Contiguity × Bilateral trade 
dependence      [4.166] 
Contiguity       -0.122 
× Global openness        [0.235] 
  IV LPM  IV Probit  IV LPM  IV LPM 
Observations  229542 229542 229542 229542 
 R
2 0.0521  -  0.0298  0.0361 
 
Note: Clustered robust standard errors by dyads and bootstrap standard errors - column (2)- are reported.  IV probit estimation 
with clustered bootstrap is reported in column (2).   
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Table 9: Impact of Military Conflicts on Bilateral Trade Dependence 
 
Dependent Variable  Bilateral Trade Dependence 
  (1) (2) 
Conflict(t) -0.00126***  -0.00035 
 [0.00035]  [0.00023] 
Conflict(t-1) -0.00118***  -0.0006*** 
 [0.00028]  [0.00018] 
Conflict(t-2) -0.00108***  -0.0005*** 
 [0.00026]  [0.00019] 
Conflict(t-3) -0.00095***  -0.00032** 
 [0.00026]  [0.00016] 
Conflict(t-4) -0.00097***  -0.00056*** 
 [0.00031]  [0.00015] 
Conflict(t-5) -0.00141***  -0.00063*** 
 [0.00035]  [0.00021] 
Square root of Product Real GDP  0.00898***  0.00436*** 
 [0.00125]  [0.00095] 
0.13013*** -0.06969**  Square root of  Product Real GDP  
per capita  [0.02211] [0.02716] 
Remoteness 0.00111***  0.00343*** 
 [0.00042]  [0.00096] 
Number of trading partners 0.00002***  0.00004*** 
 [0.00001]  [0.00001] 
GSP dummy  0.00004  -0.00045*** 
 [0.00012]  [0.00011] 
Contiguity 0.0063***  - 
 [0.0011]   
Distance(log) -0.0017***  - 
 [0.0002]   
Log Product land areas  -0.00005  - 
 [0.00003]   
Common language  -0.00003  - 
 [0.00032]   
Common colonizers  0.0005  - 
 [0.00051]   
Pair ever in colonial relationship  0.00678***   
 [0.00136]   
RTA dummy  0.01582***  0.00771*** 
 [0.00229]  [0.00110] 
Both GATT members dummy  0.00014  0.0002** 
 [0.00010]  [0.00008] 
  OLS Fixed  Effect 
Observations 251502  251502 
R-squared 0.248  0.794 
 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by dyads are in parentheses. All regressions include unreported year dummies.  
The results without the contemporaneous military conflict(t) is also qualitatively the same.  
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Table 10: Impact of Military Conflicts on Global Trade Integration 
 
Dependent Variable  Global Trade Integration 
  (1) (2) 
Conflict(t) -0.02046***  0.00683 
 [0.00668]  [0.00476] 
Conflict(t-1) -0.03115***  -0.01038** 
 [0.00533]  [0.00467] 
Conflict(t-2) -0.02664***  -0.00606* 
 [0.00520]  [0.00338] 
Conflict(t-3) -0.01994***  0.00186 
 [0.00487]  [0.00356] 
Conflict(t-4) -0.02454***  -0.00163 
 [0.00436]  [0.00398] 
-0.03254*** -0.00361  Conflict(t-5) 
  [0.00565] [0.00471] 
0.04436*** 0.01483***  Square root of Product Real GDP of 
Partners of dyads(i,j)  [0.00160] [0.00187] 
0.03175*** -0.00881***  Square root of Product Real GDP per 
capita of Partners of dyads(i,j)  [0.00182] [0.00256] 
Remoteness -0.01174*  0.57537*** 
 [0.00712]  [0.04236] 
Number of trading partners 0.00081***  0.00341*** 
 [0.00010]  [0.00025] 
EU GSP*Distance(t-2)  0.00178**  -0.00055 
 [0.00079]  [0.00067] 
Contiguity -0.05680***  - 
 [0.01338]   
Distance(log) -0.01989***  - 
 [0.00383]   
Number of other conflicts in t  -0.00580***  -0.00125*** 
 [0.00031]  [0.00040] 
One of dyads in GATT   0.05877***  0.01906*** 
(Excluding Both GATT)  [0.00560]  [0.00443] 
RTA between i and j -0.01203  0.01064 
 [0.01856]  [0.01266] 
0.00116*** 0.00078***  Number of countries in Common 
language with dyads(i,j)  [0.00010] [0.00019] 
 OLS  Fixed  Effect 
Observations 231020  231020 
R-squared 0.182  0.680 
 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by dyads are in parentheses. All regressions include unreported year dummies.  
The results without the contemporaneous military conflict(t) is also qualitatively the same.  
 34
  ADB Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration
* 
 
1.  “The ASEAN Economic Community and the European Experience” by Michael G. Plummer 
2.  “Economic Integration in East Asia: Trends, Prospects, and a Possible Roadmap” by Pradumna B. 
Rana 
3.  “Central Asia after Fifteen Years of Transition: Growth, Regional Cooperation, and Policy Choices” by 
Malcolm Dowling and Ganeshan Wignaraja 
4.  “Global Imbalances and the Asian Economies: Implications for Regional Cooperation” by Barry 
Eichengreen 
5.  “Toward Win-Win Regionalism in Asia: Issues and Challenges in Forming Efficient Trade Agreements” 
by Michael G. Plummer 
6.  “Liberalizing Cross-Border Capital Flows: How Effective Are Institutional Arrangements against Crisis 
in Southeast Asia” by Alfred Steinherr, Alessandro Cisotta, Erik Klär, and Kenan Šehović 
7.  “Managing the Noodle Bowl: The Fragility of East Asian Regionalism” by Richard E. Baldwin 
8.  “Measuring Regional Market Integration in Developing Asia: a Dynamic Factor Error Correction Model 
(DF-ECM) Approach” by Duo Qin, Marie Anne Cagas, Geoffrey Ducanes, Nedelyn Magtibay-Ramos, 
and Pilipinas F. Quising 
9.  “The Post-Crisis Sequencing of Economic Integration in Asia: Trade as a Complement to a Monetary 
Future” by Michael G. Plummer and Ganeshan Wignaraja 
10.  “Trade Intensity and Business Cycle Synchronization: The Case of East Asia” by Pradumna B. Rana 
11.  "Inequality and Growth Revisited" by Robert J. Barro 
12.  "Securitization in East Asia" by Paul Lejot, Douglas Arner, and Lotte Schou-Zibell 
13.  "Patterns and Determinants of Cross-border Financial Asset Holdings in East Asia" by Jong-Wha Lee 
14.  "Regionalism as an Engine of Multilateralism: A Case for a Single East Asian FTA" by Masahiro Kawai 
and Ganeshan Wignaraja 
15.  "The Impact of Capital Inflows on Emerging East Asian Economies: Is Too Much Money Chasing Too 
Little Good?" by Soyoung Kim and Doo Yong Yang 
16.  "Emerging East Asian Banking Systems Ten Years after the 1997/98 Crisis" by Charles Adams 
17.  "Real and Financial Integration in East Asia" by So young Kim and Jong-Wha Lee 
18.  “Global Financial Turmoil: Impact and Challenges for Asia’s Financial Systems” by Jong-Wha Lee and 
Cyn-Young Park 
19.  “Cambodia’s Persistent Dollarization: Causes and Policy Options” by Jayant Menon 
20.  "Welfare Implications of International Financial Integration" by Jong-Wha Lee and Kwanho Shin 
21.  "Is the ASEAN-Korea Free Trade Area (AKFTA) an Optimal Free Trade Area?" by Donghyun Park, 




22.  "India’s Bond Market—Developments and Challenges Ahead" by Stephen Wells and Lotte Schou-
Zibell 
23.  “Commodity Prices and Monetary Policy in Emerging East Asia” by Hsiao Chink Tang 
        * These papers can be downloaded from: (ARIC) http://aric.adb.org/reipapers/ or (ADB) http://www.adb.org/ 
         publications/category.asp?id=2805  
 
 
   About the Asian Development Bank 
ADB’s vision is an Asia and Pacific region free of poverty. Its mission is to help its developing member countries substantially 
reduce poverty and improve the quality of life of their people. Despite the region’s many successes, it remains home to two 
thirds of the world’s poor. Nearly 1.7 billion people in the region live on $2 or less a day. ADB is committed to reducing poverty 
through inclusive economic growth, environmentally sustainable growth, and regional integration.
Based in Manila, ADB is owned by 67 members, including 48 from the region. Its main instruments for helping its developing 
member countries are policy dialogue, loans, equity investments, guarantees, grants, and technical assistance. In 2007, it 
approved $10.1 billion of loans, $673 million of grant projects, and technical assistance amounting to $243 million.
About the paper
In this paper, Jong-Wha Lee and Ju Hyun Pyun examine the effect of trade integration on military conflict. Based on 
a large panel data set from 1950 to 2000, they find an increase in bilateral trade interdependence and global trade 
openness significantly promotes peace. They also find the impact of trade integration on military conflict varies 
depending on the geographical proximity: bilateral trade interdependence promotes peace more significantly for 
contiguous countries, while global trade openness contributes more to peace between distant countries.
Asian Development Bank
6 ADB Avenue, Mandaluyong City
1550 Metro Manila, Philippines
www.adb.org
Publication Stock No.  Printed in the Philippines